Strategic Delegation to Organizations*
研究了委托人将决策权授予由多个代理人组成的组织（即使代理人偏好与委托人相同）如何能提高收益，其机制在于个体选择对组织决策的影响有限，在竞争环境中可实现帕累托改进。
In this paper, we show that a principal can increase her payoffs by delegating decisions to an organization of agents—a group of rational individuals who interact according to specified rules—even when the agents’ preferences are identical to those of the principal. The mechanism driving this result rests on the limited impact of individual choices on the firm’s policy, when multiple agents interact in shaping it. In competitive environments, delegating decisions to organizations of agents augments the set of equilibrium outcomes, allowing for Pareto improvements. Hence, our results provide a novel rationale for decentralized decision‐making in firms.