Law Enforcement and Bargaining over Illicit Drug Prices: Structural Evidence from a Gang’s Ledger
利用大型跨国帮派分支的详细记录，构建谈判模型，分析不同特征的毒贩（如成瘾者或借贷者）的谈判能力差异，并评估不同执法策略对减少毒品销量的效果。
Abstract We estimate a structural model of bargaining between a branch of a large transnational gang and pushers using data from detailed records kept by the gang. The model allows for the gang’s relative bargaining power to differ for pushers with different characteristics, such as those with addictions or borrowing problems. Exploiting supply shocks in our data, we use the estimated model to study the effectiveness of various enforcement strategies. We find that targeting pushers is more effective at reducing quantities sold compared to targeting the gang’s upstream supply chain.