Negotiations with Limited Specifiability
研究谈判中各方无法完全指定结果的情形，构建协议类进行比较静态分析，发现提议异步性缩小均衡收益集，有限可指定性下均衡收益集弱大于无限情形。
We study negotiations with limited specifiability—each party may not be able to fully specify a negotiation outcome. We construct a class of negotiation protocols to conduct comparative statics on specifiability as well as move structures. We find that asynchronicity of proposal announcements narrows down the equilibrium payoff set, in particular, leading to a unique prediction in negotiations with a “common interest” alternative. The equilibrium payoff set is not a singleton in general, and depends on the fine details of how limitation on specifiability is imposed. The equilibrium payoff set is weakly larger under limited specifiability than under unlimited specifiability.