When Not One of the Crowd: The Effects of CEO Ideological Divergence on Lobbying Strategy
研究了CEO政治意识形态与执政党意识形态的差异如何影响企业游说投资及内外游说活动的平衡，发现高度监管的企业中这种影响较弱。
This paper explores the extent to which CEO ideological divergence influences firm lobbying strategy. Because a CEO’s political ideological disposition is shown to affect firm outcomes, we theorize there are nonmarket strategic implications when the governing party is divergent or convergent from their ideology. Accordingly, we integrate insights from organizational fit literature regarding value congruence and strategic complementarity in order to examine whether CEO political ideological divergence affects lobbying investment and changes the balance between internal and external lobbying activities. Further, we theorize that these outcomes are less pronounced for firms that are highly regulated. Our results support our theorizing, therefore, by identifying how CEO ideology interacts with the opposing political ideology. We unpack the ways in which CEO political ideology influences firm political behavior, thus extending research on CEO political ideology and lobbying.