Congruent Financial Regulation
全球金融危机后银行监管趋严，但导致银行业务向非银行金融机构迁移，积累系统性风险。本文提出一致性原则，建议监管者利用现有法定权力协调经济相似工具的规则，并以非优质抵押贷款和美国国债市场为例说明。
After the global financial crisis, bank regulation became more stringent, and as a result the traditional banking system was well capitalized leading into the COVID-19 pandemic. But these same regulatory changes also incentivized a continuing migration of traditional banking activities to nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs), where looser regulation allowed for dangerous buildups of systemic risk. These risks were then realized across many NBFIs and markets in 2020. While legislation to harmonize regulation across these different domains would be desirable, we do not believe it likely in the foreseeable future. In this paper we propose a congruence principle for financial regulation, whereby regulators use existing statutory authority to coordinate rules across economically similar instruments. We provide examples of how such congruence could work for the cases of nonprime mortgage finance and the markets for US Treasury securities.