A Price Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration Under Productivity Heterogeneity*
研究了产品市场价格如何影响企业边界决策，生产率高的企业倾向于一体化，生产率低的企业保持分离，价格与一体化的关系取决于价格如何改变企业内部剩余分配。
We analyze the interplay between product market prices and firm boundary decisions. Enterprises are heterogeneous with respect to productivity and they choose between two ownership structures—while centralized ownership (integration) performs well in coordinating managerial actions, dispersed ownership (non‐integration) is conducive to poor coordination. Ownership structure is monotone, i.e., high‐productivity enterprises integrate while the low‐productivity ones stay separate. Price can be positively or negatively associated with integration, depending on how price changes affect the distribution of surplus within an enterprise. A negative association may result in a backward‐bending industry supply. Our model delivers novel empirical and policy implications.