Microlevel Analysis of Institutional Intermediation in a Rudimentary Market-Based Economy: Entrepreneurship in Kathmandu’s Indrachok Market
研究了尼泊尔加德满都Indrachok市场中创业者对不同类型制度中介的偏好，发现家庭、供应商和同行创业者构成关键三角，且偏好受注册状态和微观地理位置影响。
Institutional theory research on institutional intermediation typically focuses on how institutional intermediaries address voids in market-based institutions that inhibit entrepreneurship. In doing so, the research rarely studies what types of institutional intermediaries entrepreneurs prefer to use. We address this gap with a microinstitutional inquiry of how entrepreneurs in a rudimentary market-based economy differ in the relevance they place on different types of institutional intermediaries. Using a sample from the Indrachok market in Kathmandu, Nepal, and using a three-stage qualitative and quantitative abductive investigation of a cascading set of increasingly refined research questions, we identify two key preferences for institutional intermediaries. First, we find a key institutional intermediation tripod consisting of three locally focused institutional intermediaries: family, suppliers, and peer entrepreneurs. The tripod is supplemented by institutional intermediaries with more moderate preference in this context: four other locally focused institutional intermediaries (local politicians, police, religious figures, and political gangs) and three broad-based institutional intermediaries (government, microlenders, and nongovernmental organizations). Second, the importance of suppliers and peers as institutional intermediaries reflects entrepreneurs’ registration status (registered versus unregistered) and microgeographic location (dispersed versus clustered businesses). The research reconceptualizes institutional intermediation in rudimentary market-based economies from the entrepreneurs’ perspective, identifying mechanisms that shape entrepreneurs’ preferences and providing proposition for future testing. Funding: This research was partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 71620107001]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2021.1531 .