Do Sell‐Side Analysts Play a Role in Hedge Fund Activism? Evidence from Textual Analysis*
通过文本分析构建激进主义词典，发现对冲基金干预目标公司的卖方分析师报告比对照公司包含更多激进内容，且分析师信息与干预收益正相关，表明分析师在支持对冲基金激进主义中发挥信息作用。
ABSTRACT We investigate variation in information production by sell‐side analysts and its potential role in hedge fund activist intervention, an important external corporate governance mechanism that creates shareholder value. Using textual analysis to derive an activism dictionary from intervention objectives and tactics, we find substantially more activism content in pre‐intervention analyst reports of target firms than propensity score matched control firms. Activism content is associated with more detailed reports containing more quantitative information. Target firm intervention‐date stock returns are significantly higher when activist intention (13D) filings are supported by reports with more general and objective‐specific activism content. Of activists' public letters to stakeholders, 31.9% directly mention sell‐side analysis, amplifying the association between target returns and analyst report information. The relationship between analyst information and activism returns is robust to using brokerage closures as an exogenous shock and is consistent with analyst incentives. Activist funds with no prior disclosed position in target firms and more experienced funds capture higher returns from sell‐side information. Overall, our results suggest sell‐side analysts play a significant informational role in supporting hedge fund activism.