Ethical fashion supply chain operations: product development and moral hazards
通过博弈论模型分析时尚企业在产品开发中是否采用道德运营（ETO）的决策，包括定价和产品绿色度，并探讨道德风险问题，为供应链管理者提供激励措施建议。
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is critical. As a part of CSR, fashion companies have to decide whether to be ethical or not during the product development process. Motivated by real-world practices, we conduct a gametheoretic modeling analysis and derive the firms’ optimal decisions (including ethical operations (ETO) adoption, pricing, and product greenness level) in fashion product development. We identify a key moderating factor which governs how an increase of basic market demand significantly affects the optimal product greenness level and how an increase of basic production cost influences the optimal retail price. Furthermore, we find that there is a threshold that plays a critical role in determining whether the optimal retail price and product greenness level are higher or lower with the adoption of ETO. We prove that when the fixed payment from the retailer to the manufacturer under the ETO case is set to be sufficiently small, the retailer prefers to adopt ETO and requests the manufacturer to follow. We propose three practical measures (including the use of technologies) to help encourage the supply chain members to invest in ETO willingly. We finally consider the probable occurrence of moral hazard problems and explore the managerial implications.