Supply-Side Reforms to Oil and Gas Production on Federal Lands: Modeling the Implications for CO2Emissions, Federal Revenues, and Leakage
研究了针对联邦土地油气生产的三种政策（碳附加费和租赁禁令）对二氧化碳减排、联邦收入及泄漏效应的影响，发现租赁禁令减排效果约为清洁电力计划的四分之一，但每年减少50亿美元收入；碳附加费减排较少但可增收，且石油和天然气的最优碳附加费不同。
Policy reforms targeting federal oil and gas production are increasingly considered as approaches to reduce CO2 emissions. Yet such policies are controversial, in part due to leakage concerns. I model the effects of three such policies, including carbon adders and a leasing ban. Accounting for leakage, a leasing ban reduces emissions by about one-quarter of the amount originally projected for the Clean Power Plan but reduces royalty revenues by $5 billion annually. Carbon adders reduce emissions less but can raise billions of dollars annually. Charging the same carbon adder for both oil and gas is not revenue-maximizing because gas production is more sensitive to the adder. I estimate revenue-maximizing adders of $40/ton for oil and $5/ton for gas, but higher revenues come at the cost of higher emissions than achieved by charging adders based on the social cost of carbon. These results highlight important policy trade-offs in federal leasing reforms.