On young Turks and yes men: optimal contracting for advice
研究了委托人如何设计契约来激励代理人提供研究建议，发现对于高成本项目，委托人应忽略极端建议以降低代理成本，对于低成本项目则应忽略温和建议。
Abstract We study contracting for advice by an agent about how much a principal should invest in a project. Providing the agent with incentives to perform research endogenously generates incentives for her to misreport the results. For high‐cost (low‐cost) projects, she wishes to overstate (understate) the magnitude—though not the direction—of her research findings. For high‐cost projects, the principal mitigates the concomitant agency rents by committing to ignore extreme (Young‐Turk) recommendations, whereas for low‐cost projects, he ignores mild (Yes‐Man) ones. These results are shown to be robust to several natural extensions of the model.