Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises, Revisited
研究了政府缺乏偿还到期债务承诺时，可能引发自我实现的债务危机，包括以低价发行更多债务或被迫紧缩，并发现这些行为会大幅增加利差波动。
Lack of commitment at the time of auction to repayment of imminently maturing debt can generate a run on debt and immediate default. We show that the same lack of commitment leads to other possible self-fulfilling crises, including issuance of more debt at depressed prices, or a “sudden stop” (forced austerity) in which debt issuance is sharply curtailed. Both outcomes stem from the government's incentive to eliminate uncertainty about imminent payments at the time of auction by altering the level of debt issuance. These outcomes generate a large increase in spread volatility in both a 1-period and a multiperiod quantitative debt model.