Information, Bertrand–Edgeworth competition and the law of one price
研究了同质商品在同一市场出现不同价格的现象，通过容量约束的价格博弈模型，发现卖方对市场需求信息不对称且厌恶模糊时，可能选择不同价格，违反一价定律。
Homogeneous goods often sell at different prices within the same market. This paper proposes a theoretical foundation for this phenomenon in the context of a capacity-constrained price game. Sellers have asymmetric information about the market demand, modelled by a partition of the state space, and evaluate uncertain profits in a way consistent with ambiguity aversion. We demonstrate that a pure strategy price equilibrium exists if the market demand is uniformly elastic in each state. Interestingly, the sellers may choose different prices, violating the law of one price. Moreover, market demand may be rationed between the sellers, resulting in consumers purchasing at different prices.