Institutional investor distraction and innovation
研究发现机构投资者分心会削弱董事会对管理层的监督和咨询支持，导致企业研发、专利申请、引用和创造力下降，且影响集中在低关注度机构持股的企业和竞争替代监督较弱的行业。
Abstract Prior studies suggest high institutional ownership provides stable funding for firm managers supporting long‐term innovation. However, we hypothesize that the level of holdings can also proxy for institutional attention. We address this question and find that institutional distraction negatively impacts board monitoring and advisory support for management, reducing R&D, patent filings, citations and creativity. Distraction is concentrated in (1) firms owned by institutions providing low attention before the shock and (2) industries facing low substitute monitoring through competition. Distraction also affects information flow in firms facing high labour mobility and high peer firm innovation (technology spillovers).