The Value of Confidential Policy Information: Persuasion, Transparency, and Influence
本文研究政策制定者在与游说者互动前获取信息的决策，发现机密性有助于从利益集团获取证据，且政策制定者越专业，利益集团影响力反而可能越大。
Abstract Transparency of the lobbying process is hailed as an effective means to limit the influence of special interest groups, but should transparency also apply to the information obtained by policy makers (PMs)? This article extends theories of informational lobbying by explicitly modeling the choice of PMs to obtain information before interacting with lobbyists. This approach reveals a new channel for the value of confidentiality: extracting evidence from special interest groups. It shows that, counter-intuitively, the influence of special interest groups can increase as PMs become more expert. These results shed light on the relationship between confidentiality, good governance, and influence.