Lending Relationships and Optimal Monetary Policy
构建并校准了一个包含内生贷款关系的公司金融货币模型，研究货币政策如何影响企业融资选择，并分析在贷款关系意外破坏后，不同承诺假设下的最优货币政策。
Abstract We construct and calibrate a monetary model of corporate finance with endogenous formation of lending relationships. The equilibrium features money demands by firms that depend on their access to credit and a pecking order of financing means. We describe the mechanism through which monetary policy affects the creation of relationships and firms’ incentives to use internal or external finance. We study optimal monetary policy following an unanticipated destruction of relationships under different commitment assumptions. The Ramsey solution uses forward guidance to expedite creation of new relationships by committing to raise the user cost of cash gradually above its long-run value. Absent commitment, the user cost is kept low, delaying recovery.