Damage sensitivity and stability in international environmental agreements
研究了当各国对环境损害高度敏感时，国际环境协定中大型联盟（包括全体联盟）可能成为均衡结果，为《蒙特利尔议定书》等大型协定提供了新解释。
Abstract This article examines the formation of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). The economic literature focuses on scenarios where countries are weakly sensitive to environmental damages (constant or linear marginal damages) and finds that stable coalitions are small when countries choose their emission strategies simultaneously and the marginal benefit function is linear. Motivated by empirical evidence, our analysis addresses cases where countries are highly sensitive to environmental damages. In this context, we find equilibrium behaviors that reverse conventional wisdom. For instance, large coalitions including the grand coalition can be supported as an equilibrium outcome when the sensitivity of countries to environmental conditions its high. Our findings provide an additional explanation for large-scale IEAs such as the Montreal Protocol.