The Influence of Management's Internal Audit Experience on Earnings Management*
研究发现，有内部审计经验的管理者所在公司更少进行真实盈余管理，但对应计盈余管理无显著影响；这种效应在管理者权力较大或担任财务职务时更强。
ABSTRACT We examine whether firms with managers that have prior internal audit experience are less likely to manage earnings. This examination is important because the internal audit function (IAF) is uniquely positioned to provide experiences that could influence future managerial behavior, including limiting the potential negative repercussions of earnings management. We find that firms with managers that have internal audit experience are associated with lower real earnings management (REM) but not accruals‐based earnings management. Effects are strongest when managers with internal audit experience have greater power or currently hold financial roles, or when there are a greater number of managers with internal audit experience. The results are robust to including firm fixed effects, using entropy‐balancing and performance‐matching approaches, using a subsample of firm‐years required to have an IAF, using a subsample of firms for which we can measure IAF quality, and measuring internal audit experience at a previous employer. These results point to an important benefit of manager internal audit experience, as research suggests that REM is common, difficult to detect, not always within the scope of financial reporting regulators, and detrimental to future performance.