Power and Tactics in Bargaining
本文基于权力依赖理论，通过模拟劳资薪酬谈判实验，分析谈判者如何根据自身依赖维度（如替代方案、结果价值）选择策略，发现自身依赖而非对手依赖是策略选择的主要依据。
This paper develops and tests an analytical framework for analyzing the selection of tactics in bargaining.Using a variant of power-dependence theory, the authors propose that bargainers will use different dimensions of dependence, such as the availability of alternative outcomes from other sources and the value of the outcomes at stake, to select among different tactics.Tc test this model, the authors conducted two simulation experiments that portrayed an employee-employer conflict overa pay raise, manipulating four dimensions of dependence: employee's outcome alternatives, employee's outcome value, employer's outcome alternatives, and employer's outcome value.Within thiscontext, respondents estimated the likelihood of each actor (employee, employer) adopting four tactics: self-enhancement, coalition, threat to leave, and conflict avoidance.The results of one experiment show that an actor's own dependence, rather than his opponent's dependence on him, is the primary basis for his evaluation and selection of tactics, and also that decisions regarding different tactics are determined by different dimensions of dependence.The results of the other experiment indicate that the opponent's initial lactic affects the links between dimensions of dependence and an actor's tactics, and the dimensions of dependence affect the propensity toward "tactic matching."B ARGAINING behavior is typically pre- ceded by an evaluation of the available tactics and of the power relationship between the bargainers.Indeed, it would be •