Designing long-term incentives that promote innovation instead of value capture
借鉴大型项目与公司创新的共同挑战，指出股票期权等强激励对创新的净效果微乎其微，并探讨监管政策如何设计更好的长期激励方案。
Abstract Major projects share at least two common challenges with corporations pursuing innovation: the need to coordinate many complementary constituents and the temporal separation between upfront costs and future benefits. In the corporate context, high-powered incentives such as stock options have been popularized as a way to reward executives for successfully navigating these challenges. However, research shows that these high-powered incentives can have hidden negative effects, such that options have a negligible net impact on promoting innovation. Yet few alternatives for promoting innovation have been designed, allowing stock options and other high-powered incentives to remain common in the belief they are the best available approach. This article uses the parallels between the corporate context and major projects to draw implications for regulatory policy-makers to obtain more favourable outcomes.