The Determinants of Foreign Multinational Enterprise Firms' Board Governance in Caribbean Offshore Island Economies
研究了加勒比地区171家上市公司中，外国跨国公司持股比例如何影响子公司董事会构成，发现高持股导致聘请更多律师、更少会计师，而低持股则相反。
Using a unique sample of 171 listed firms in the Caribbean region, this paper explores the influence of post-entry ownership of foreign MNEs on the board composition of subsidiaries. Our findings reveal higher ownership is a means of enhancing the security of property rights while simultaneously creating a liability of foreignness. This causes subsidiaries to externally contract for resources, leading to the hiring of more lawyers and fewer accountants. The opposite is true for progressively lower levels of foreign MNE ownership. Firms' adoption of shareholder rights governance amplifies these findings, while state formal institutional quality reverses them.