De Facto Bank Bailouts
研究发现美国政府利用其在IMF的投票权，将贷款引导至美国银行有主权违约风险的国家，形成事实上的银行救助，且这种效应在直接救助成本高时更强，欧洲主要IMF成员国也有类似现象。
Abstract The U.S. government uses its voting power to direct IMF loans to countries where U.S. banks are exposed to sovereign default (a de facto bailout). This effect is stronger in years when the costs of direct bailouts are higher and is also found among major European IMF members. We find that de facto bailouts reduce government incentives to default and that U.S. Congressional voting on IMF funding is consistent with a private interest view of government. Overall, we identify an alternative mechanism through which governments can backstop the losses of large multinational banks.