Stakeholder governance and private benefits: The case of politicians in Spanish cajas
研究西班牙储蓄银行中政治董事是否通过个人贷款、政党贷款及所代表机构贷款获取私人利益，发现政治董事比例越高，贷款规模越大且条件更优，存在基于政党认同的内群体偏袒。
Our research focuses on the private benefits of politicians as board directors of Spanish savings banks (cajas). We use hand-collected data on the political affiliation and personal loans of 1,578 directors to investigate whether political directors used private benefits through excessive personal loans, loans granted to their political parties, or the institutions they represented. Our results show that a higher proportion of political directors on a board is associated with larger personal loans and with better terms than those granted to non-political directors. Furthermore, this higher proportion is also linked to larger loans granted to the public administrations that the political directors represented on the cajas’ governing board. Finally, we also find in-group favouritism based on the social identity theory and directors’ party identification. Therefore, political directors make greater use of private benefits when allocated to their political party and its members.