Agency Costs and Strategic Speculation in the U.S. Stock Market
研究代理问题导致的信息不对称如何影响股票流动性，发现反收购条款的通过降低了投机者的信息优势，从而改善了公司股票流动性，尤其对治理差、不确定性高的公司效果更明显。
Abstract This study investigates the notion that agency-driven information asymmetry may affect a firm’s stock liquidity. I postulate that less uncertainty about managerial agency problems may enhance liquidity provision by lowering dealers’ perceived adverse selection risk from trading with better-informed speculators. Consistent with my conjecture, I find that the staggered adoption of antitakeover provisions across U.S. states in the 1980s and 1990s — a plausibly exogenous shock unambiguously reducing the threat of (and speculators’ information advantage about) value-enhancing intervention — robustly improves the stock liquidity of affected firms relative to peer firms, especially at prior high fundamental or agency uncertainty and with poor governance. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.