The power of the market over government officials: Evidence from an anticorruption campaign in China
利用中国反腐运动中中央巡视组进驻的时机，研究发现巡视期间股价中嵌入的企业信息反而增加，尤其在法律环境差、社会联系强或国有企业中，表明市场能挫败地方官员隐藏企业负面新闻的企图。
Abstract Exploiting a recent anticorruption campaign in China, an event that incentivizes government officials to hide negative news from central inspection teams (CITs), we study whether market participants can counter that. We find that firm‐level information embedded in stock price actually increases during CIT visits, especially in regions with poor legal environments, stronger social connection, or state‐owned firms. Further, media coverage, analyst coverage, and corporate site visits by external stakeholders increase during the CIT visits. Collectively, our findings indicate that the market defeats local government officials’ attempt to hide firm‐specific news.