Wages and Informality in Developing Countries
构建了一个工资竞价模型，分析企业选择正规或非正规部门以及工人随机搜寻工作的均衡结果，并用巴西数据估计模型，发现加强执法不会增加失业，反而通过优化工人与高生产率岗位的匹配提升工资、总产出和福利。
We develop an equilibrium wage-posting model with heterogeneous firms that decide to locate in the formal or the informal sector and workers who search randomly on and off the job. We estimate the model on Brazilian labor force survey data. In equilibrium, firms of equal productivity locate in different sectors, a fact observed in the data. Wages are characterized by compensating differentials. We show that tightening enforcement does not increase unemployment and increases wages, total output, and welfare by enabling better allocation of workers to higher productivity jobs and improving competition in the formal labor market.