Investment of Green Technology in a Tourism Supply Chain Under Competition
研究一个景区和两家旅行社组成的绿色旅游供应链，分析非合作、单边合作和双边合作下各方的最优绿色技术投资，发现游客绿色偏好和旅行社竞争强度的影响，并提出能实现帕累托改进的双边合作策略。
This article considers a green tourism supply chain (GTSC) composed of one scenic spot (SS) and two travel agencies (TAs) and derives the optimal green technology investments of the SS and TAs in the noncooperation, unilateral cooperation, and bilateral cooperation scenarios by establishing Stackelberg differential games. In addition, we investigate how the green tourism preference of tourists and the competition intensities of the TAs affect the green technology investments of the GTSC members and the greenness levels of tourism products. Our study indicates that the green technology investments of the GTSC members and the greenness levels of tourism products increase with the increasing of tourists’ green tourism preference. We also find that the green technology investments of the TAs and the greenness levels of tourism products change along with the competition intensity of the TAs, but the green technology investment of the SS remains unchanged. Meanwhile, we propose a bilateral cooperation policy that can achieve Pareto improvement of the GTSC performance.