International Environmental Agreements and Black Technology
用动态博弈分析国际环境协定的稳定性，发现无论合同是否完整，只有小联盟能稳定，这与以往研究认为不完整合同能扩大联盟的结论不同。
Abstract This paper analyzes the stability of international environmental agreements in a dynamic game when the generation of both renewables and fossil fuel based energy requires specialized capital stocks or technologies, respectively. Two contract types are considered. At an incomplete (a complete) contract, the coalition coordinates only (both) CO $$_2$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:msub><mml:mrow/><mml:mn>2</mml:mn></mml:msub></mml:math> emissions (and renewable energy investments) of its members. In contrast to the results of Battaglini and Harstad (J Polit Econ 124:160–204, 2016) who endorse incomplete contracts to increase the coalition size, only small coalitions are stable regardless of whether the contract is complete or incomplete. This result also holds if black technology is temporary not completely used or transfers are considered.