Labor Market Benefit of Disaggregated Disclosure*
研究发现，CEO候选人前雇主的分拆财务披露能帮助招聘公司评估候选人与岗位的匹配度，美国SFAS 131准则改革后，分拆信息改善了CEO与公司的匹配质量，减少了信息不对称带来的效率损失。
ABSTRACT Asymmetric information is a fundamental friction that results in mismatches and efficiency losses in the labor market. In this study, we posit that more disaggregated financial disclosure by a CEO candidate's prior employer can help the hiring firm better assess the possible fit between its operational needs and the candidate's skill set. Using a mandatory segment reporting reform in the United States (SFAS 131) as an exogenous shock to disclosure disaggregation, we find a significant increase in the firm‐CEO match quality when the hiring firm has access to more disaggregated segment information about the external candidate's past employment. Furthermore, the improvement in firm‐CEO matching is greater when segment information is incrementally more useful for evaluation of candidate skills. These findings reveal a novel labor market benefit of disaggregated financial disclosure: alleviating pre‐hiring information deficiencies and facilitating efficient allocation of CEO talent across firms.