Board corruption and loan contracts
研究发现，银行会向董事会腐败感知程度高的公司收取更高的贷款利差和更严格的契约条款，且在公司治理薄弱时影响更强。
Abstract In this study, we examine the effects of board corruption on the financing costs of firms. We construct an index of perceived corruption that uses the average level of corruption that is linked to a director's surname. The evidence shows that lending banks attach higher spreads and stricter covenants to the loan contracts of firms with high perceived board corruption. Specifically, when the perceived board corruption increases after mergers and acquisitions, firms are charged higher loan spreads. Further analysis shows that the effects of board corruption on financing costs become stronger when firms have weak governance mechanisms. These results show that banks recognize board corruption as a source of agency problem with borrowers when they make lending decisions.