Revealing good deeds: disclosure of social responsibility in competitive markets
通过实验研究竞争市场中生产者是否自愿披露产品社会责任的决策，发现自愿且无成本的披露几乎能达到强制透明的效果，但信息不完美时社会责任水平显著降低。
We experimentally study competitive markets with socially responsible production. Our main focus is on the producers' decision whether or not to reveal the degree of social responsibility of their product. Compared to two benchmark cases where either full transparency is enforced or no disclosure is possible, we show that voluntary and costless disclosure comes close to the full transparency benchmark. However, when the informational content of disclosure is imperfect, social responsibility in the market is significantly lower than under full transparency. Our results highlight an important role for transparent and standardized information about social externalities. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-022-09752-z.