Designing Incentives for Heterogeneous Researchers
研究委托人（如政府）如何与成本未知的研究者（如疫苗开发者）签订合同，以激励其进行昂贵实验。通过贝叶斯劝说模型刻画实验形式与结果强度的差异，发现最优合同会扭曲实验以筛选研究者，且基于实验结果签约与基于实验本身签约无效率损失。
A principal (e.g., the US government) contracts with a researcher with unknown costs (e.g., a vaccine developer) to conduct a costly experiment. This contracting problem has a novel feature that captures the difference between the form of an experiment and the strength of its results: researchers face a problem of information design rather than optimal effort. Using a novel comparative static for Bayesian persuasion settings, I characterize the optimal contract and show how experimentation is distorted by the need to screen researchers. Moreover, I show that there is no loss from contracting on the experiment’s result rather than the experiment itself.