Performance, Perception, and Manager Selection
研究发现机构投资者在挑选经理人时并未增加价值，但调查显示养老金官员对此高度自信。作者认为这种矛盾源于投资者使用了不当的基准，特别是未评估被解雇的经理人。
Empirical evidence in the finance literature clearly demonstrates that institutional investors do not add value from selecting managers. Yet plan sponsors are highly confident in their manager selection abilities, as shown by results from three surveys reported in this article. The author proposes that the apparent inconsistency between performance and perception is due to investors using inappropriate benchmarks—specifically, they do not evaluate terminated managers. As evidence, the author presents regression results that show a near-zero statistical relationship between surveyed pension officers’ self-confidence and their belief in the importance of evaluating performance of investment decisions.