Financial Market Ethics
构建了一个网络上的心理博弈模型，研究内生且理性选择的伦理如何影响非伦理或伦理行为的传染，并量化了决定传染的关键行为簇密度，最后引入社会作为第三方来探讨伦理失败的外部性。
Abstract We develop a model of psychological-games-played-on-a-network to demonstrate a role for endogenously determined, rationally chosen ethics. Our analysis produces sharp results about contagion of nonethical or ethical behavior and the possible equilibrium configurations of each type of behavior. We find, and quantify, critical densities for clusters of each type of behavior that determine everything about contagion. We introduce society as a third player to investigate ethical failures as externalities. We use these results to show how regulations and network structure can affect whether clusters of ethical behavior can survive and how large they can be in a financial market setting.