Investment preferences and risk perception: Financial agents versus clients
研究了金融代理人（如理财顾问）与客户在投资术语理解上的差异，发现双方对投资风险认知不一致导致沟通失败，代理人虽愿按客户偏好操作却因认知偏差而失败，且金钱激励影响甚微。
We study four fundamental components of financial agency settings: The perception of commonly used investment profile terminology, agents’ customization of portfolios to clients’ preferences, the effect of agents’ and clients’ preferences on investment levels, and the role of compensation schemes. We observe large heterogeneity in the perception of investment profiles, resulting in substantial miscommunication between clients and agents. Financial agents show a high willingness to implement their clients’ preferred investment profiles, yet appear to fail because of deviating perceptions. Agents’ own investment preferences matter, but take a back seat to clients’ preferences in determining investment shares. Different monetary incentive schemes hardly affect behavior. Our results suggest that moral constraints can limit agents’ discretion in the agency situation.