Who shall succeed? An examination of manager overconfidence and CEO selection
研究了董事会如何从具有不同自信特质（过度自信、理性、不自信）的高管中战略性地选择CEO继任者，发现正常退休时倾向选择相同特质者，而解雇或经营衰退时则倾向选择理性继任者。
Abstract By categorizing managerial confidence attributes into overconfidence, rationality and diffidence with the methodology used in the finance literature, we investigate how company boards strategically select chief executive officer (CEO) replacements from the senior management pool with different confidence attributes. In normal retirements, company boards tend to select succeeding managers with the same confidence attribute as retiring CEOs. If boards fire company CEOs, they tend to select rational successors irrespective of the confidence attributes of the ousted CEOs. Such board inclination of picking rational successors also occurs when corporate operation is at the recession stage or corporate strategy is changed surrounding succession. The evidence indicates that the managerial confidence attribute is an important consideration of the board in the CEO selection process and that the board deliberately selects the CEO with a certain attribute to move the firm in a planned direction.