Industry tournament incentives and corporate innovation strategies
研究发现CEO劳动力市场的锦标赛式晋升激励会促使企业增加短期产品创新，但减少长期专利创新，且在产品竞争激烈或CEO获胜概率高时效果更强。
Abstract In this article we examine how the tournament‐like progression in the CEO labor market influences corporate innovation strategies. By exploiting a text‐based proxy for product innovation based on product descriptions from 10‐Ks, we find a positive and significant relation between industry tournament incentives (ITIs) and product innovation. We then explore the trade‐off effects of ITIs on product innovation created through long‐term patenting technologies and short‐term product development. We discover that ITIs strengthen short‐term innovation but decrease patent‐based innovation. Further analyses show that the effect of ITIs on product innovation is stronger when the product market is more competitive and when CEO characteristics indicate a higher probability of winning the tournament prize.