Evidence on the Effects of an Audit Quality Bonus
通过实验研究审计质量奖金对审计师绩效的影响，发现其效果取决于审计师的趋近动机和压力水平，低压力下对低动机者有正面作用，高压力下则无效果。
Audit quality rewards might create incentives for auditors to enhance their performance. We examine whether the effects of an audit quality bonus are contingent on appetitive motivation and engagement pressure. Appetitive motivation is a personality trait of goal pursuits that consists of drive, reward responsiveness, and fun seeking. Engagement pressure is the conflict between meeting time budgets and complying with auditing standards. Relying on cognitive evaluation theory, we expect that an audit quality bonus increases audit quality for auditors with lower appetitive motivation and decreases audit quality for auditors with higher appetitive motivation when engagement pressure is low. When engagement pressure is high, the effects of an audit quality bonus are difficult to predict. In an experiment with 420 auditors, we manipulate an audit quality bonus and the level of engagement pressure and measure appetitive motivation. The results are consistent with our expectations in the setting of low engagement pressure, but only for drive. In the setting of high engagement pressure, we find no effects for an audit quality bonus. When considering audit quality rewards, it is important to acknowledge the typical audit environment of conflicting pressures and the level of drive that both can constrain these rewards’ effectiveness.