Path dependencies and institutional traps in water governance – Evidence from Cambodia
基于柬埔寨田野调查，发现村庄间水资源合作与基础设施差异可能源于制度陷阱：初始合作不足导致设施差、水资源短缺和收入低，形成恶性循环。通过基于主体的模型，证实系统存在多重均衡，初始条件决定社区能否摆脱陷阱。
In many parts of the world, social norms of cooperation are an important element of decentralized water governance carried out by local communities. Field work in Cambodia documents that some villages have well-functioning water infrastructure and high cooperation, while others have poor infrastructure and low cooperation. We hypothesize that this outcome may be the result of an institutional trap, where initial lack of cooperation leads to poor infrastructure, water scarcity, and low revenues, undermining cooperation further in a vicious cycle. Conditional cooperation may explain why some communities can overcome such an institutional trap. We develop an agent-based model, in which users have to decide how much to contribute to water infrastructure and how much water to extract. This decision is based on economic considerations, but also reputational concerns, where own decisions are evaluated against the social norm. We find that the system features alternative stable states, depending on initial conditions. If the system has initially a functioning water system and high cooperation, prosperity can be created, which facilitates further investments in water infrastructure, fostering cooperation further. If the community features initial scarcity, cooperation is relatively costly, undermining investments in water infrastructure, leaving the community in an institutional trap.