Non-Price and Price Performance Vesting Provisions and CEO Incentives
研究了CEO薪酬合同中价格与非价格绩效指标的权重分配，发现噪声越大的指标权重越低，且会计准则变更后这一关系增强，增加非价格激励能提升企业绩效。
ABSTRACT A large body of empirical work provides mixed support for the central prediction from agency theory that noisier performance measures receive less weight in incentive contracts. We develop a method to calculate price-based and non-price-based performance measure weights using CEO pay and holdings of stock, options, and performance-vested awards. Consistent with theory, we find that noisier performance measures receive less weight. We find that this negative relation strengthened following the adoption of ASC 718 (formerly SFAS 123R), which equalized the accounting treatment for options and other share-based awards. We further find that firms that increased non-price incentives for CEOs realized improvements in ROA and in Tobin's Q. Our results suggest that misaligned incentives prior to ASC 718, and the under-weighting of non-price measures in particular, negatively affected firm performance. JEL Classifications: G30; J33; M12; M52.