The Information Content of Corporate Earnings: Evidence from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
研究1934年证券交易法是否提高了公司盈余披露的信息含量，采用短窗口事件研究和双重差分法，发现法案后盈余信息含量增加，尤其对之前隐瞒披露的公司和受更强监管的公司更明显。
ABSTRACT We examine whether the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 increased the information content of corporate earnings disclosures. Prior research questions whether the Act improved disclosure quality but generally relies on long‐window tests and yields mixed results. We focus on whether the Act increased earnings informativeness, improving upon prior designs by focusing on short earnings announcement windows and employing a difference‐in‐differences design to control for potential contemporaneous structural changes. We document an increase in earnings informativeness following the Act, which is larger for treatment firms (which withheld disclosure before the Act) than for control firms. The increase in informativeness is more pronounced for firms that are subject to stronger enforcement.