Bank Supervision
本文批判性回顾了银行监管的实证与理论文献，聚焦微观审慎监管，指出监管不仅确保合规，还通过软信息缓解银行倒闭的外部性，但监管加强是否以信贷供给减少为代价尚无共识。
We provide a critical review of the empirical and theoretical literature on bank supervision. This review focuses on microprudential supervision: the supervision of individual banking institutions aimed at assessing the financial and operational health of those firms. Theory suggests that supervision is required not only to ensure compliance with regulation but also to allow for the use of soft information in mitigating externalities of bank failure. Empirically, more intensive supervision results in reduced risk-taking, but less consensus has been found on whether the risk-reducing impact of supervision comes at the cost of reduced credit supply. Theoretical costs and benefits of supervisory disclosure have been outlined, and this disclosure is informative to investors; however, it is difficult to identify the impact of disclosure distinct from supervisory and regulatory changes.