Threat of Sabotage as a Driver of Collective Action
研究了当公共品贡献者面临一个事后破坏其努力的对手时，其福利可能增加。对手会最大程度地破坏最小努力，从而锁定高努力水平，在努力互补性足够大时提高贡献者福利。
Abstract A model is presented where the welfare of contributors to a public good can increase when they face an adversary who ex post sabotages their efforts. It is a best response for the adversary to maximally sabotage the smallest effort, thus increasing a defector's marginal product of effort. This creates a kink in the individual contributor's payoff function around the equilibrium effort, which can lock contributors into exerting high effort. For a sufficiently large degree of complementarity between the contributors’ efforts, the adversary increases contributors’ welfare. This result is robust when departing from several simplifying assumptions of the model.