Micro-Prudential Regulation and Loan Monitoring
研究了微观审慎监管下银行贷款监控系统的价值，发现动态监控系统因监管成本过高而不盈利，静态系统则有正价值，揭示了微观审慎监管的潜在弱点。
Abstract We evaluate the value of loan monitoring systems for a bank controlled by a micro-prudential regulator. We investigate dynamic systems (an information channel that generates information flow about quality) and static systems (where the lender receives a single signal about loan quality). We find that dynamic systems carry a regulatory charge that dominates the benefit of the systems and are therefore unprofitable, whereas static systems have positive value. Specifically, lenders can profitably dismantle their dynamic systems and instead turn to static monitoring systems. The model reveals, therefore, a potential weakness of micro-prudential regulation.