Bargaining power and segmented markets: Evidence from rental and owner‐occupied housing
研究将议价能力纳入搜索模型，分析住房市场中投资者与自住者之间的议价差异，利用佛罗里达州奥兰治县数据发现考虑投资者议价能力后租赁折扣更大，且投资者相对议价能力在买卖中不对称。
Abstract In segmented markets for heterogeneous goods, prices reflect a mixture of demand for characteristics, bargaining power and market segmentation. This article integrates bargaining into the search model to investigate bargaining for housing across investors and owner‐occupiers when the investment housing segment is also subject to a rental property discount. It provides a framework for empirically identifying separate price effects of property type and bargaining power. We exploit homestead exemption information to empirically identify sellers and buyers as investors or owner‐occupiers. Data from Orange County, Florida, over 2000–2012 show a greater rental discount when controlling for investor bargaining power than when estimated in the conventional manner. In addition, investor relative bargaining power is not the same when selling to an owner‐occupier as when buying from an owner‐occupier. The results are robust across market phases and across neighborhoods.