Wealth inequality, systemic financial fragility and government intervention
研究了财富不平等如何通过储户策略互补性增加系统性银行挤兑概率，并分析了政府干预对资源分配和危机可能性的影响。
Abstract Does wealth inequality make financial crises more likely? If so, how can a government intervene, and how does this affect the distribution of resources in the economy? To answer these questions, we study a banking model where strategic complementarities among wealth-heterogeneous depositors trigger systemic self-fulfilling runs. In equilibrium, higher wealth inequality increases directly the incentives to run of the poor, and indirectly those of the rich via higher bank liquidity insurance, thus increasing the probability of a systemic self-fulfilling run overall. A government intervention on illiquid but solvent banks redistributes resources towards the poor and makes systemic self-fulfilling runs less likely.