Minimum Wage and Individual Worker Productivity: Evidence from a Large US Retailer
研究美国一家大型零售商的绩效工资工人，发现最低工资上涨后工人生产率提高、被解雇减少，但监督较弱时生产率下降，利润减少而工人福利增加。
We study workers who are employed by a large US retailer, work in many store locations, and are paid based on performance. By means of a border-discontinuity analysis, we document that workers become more productive and are terminated less often after a minimum wage increase. These effects are stronger among workers whose pay is more often supported by the minimum wage. However, when workers are monitored less intensely, the minimum wage depresses productivity. We interpret these findings through an efficiency wage model. After a minimum wage increase, profits decrease, and a calibration exercise suggests that worker welfare increases.