Liquidity and Discipline. Bank due Diligence Over the Business Cycle
构建动态一般均衡模型，研究银行流动性获取和贷款组合价值如何影响其尽职调查激励，发现美国银行数据支持尽职调查在经济扩张期恶化、收缩期加强，这削弱了流动性冲击对投资和产出的影响，但可能放大贷款质量冲击。
Abstract The quality of bank lending is increasingly viewed as a force driving the buildup and unfolding of crises. In a dynamic general equilibrium model, we show that banks’ access to liquidity and the values of loan portfolios govern banks’ incentives and effectiveness in producing information on loans. Consistent with granular loan-level evidence from US banks, the calibrated model predicts that loan due diligence deteriorates during expansions and intensifies during contractions. This countercyclicality attenuates investment and output effects of liquidity shocks but can moderately amplify loan quality shocks. Credit policies may dilute stabilizing effects of due diligence.