Bank–client cross‐ownership of bank stocks: A network analysis
研究了银行与客户交叉持股对银行治理、风险承担和系统性风险的影响，发现这种交叉持股降低了银行风险但增加了系统性风险，且在金融危机时影响更强。
Abstract We examine the effects of banks' client stock ownership structure on their governance mechanism, risk taking, and systemic risk in the financial system. We apply a dyadic level of analysis to provide new insights into the relevance of such cross‐ownership as an effective monitoring mechanism and as a source of interconnectedness between and among financial institutions. Our empirical results indicate that bank–client cross‐ownership of bank stocks is negatively associated with the riskiness of bank holding companies and positively associated with systemic risk. Moreover, the effects of such cross‐ownership on systemic risk are stronger in times of a financial crisis.