I only fear when I hear: How media affects insider trading in takeover targets
研究发现，《华尔街日报》关于过去并购中非法内幕交易的文章，会使目标公司内部人在投标公告前的股票购买量下降75%，表明媒体对机会主义内幕交易有短期威慑作用。
We study how target firm insiders respond to Wall Street Journal articles referring to illegal insider trading in past mergers. Such articles lead to target insider share purchases before bid announcement to drop by 75%. This effect is stronger nearer the bid announcement and increases with article visibility. It remains significant after controlling for public enforcement intensity, but is weakened by the greater potential for profitable trading. Our results suggest insider trading articles temporarily heighten the perception of litigation and reputation risks. Overall, our study indicates that such articles have a meaningful short-term deterrence effect on opportunistic insider trading, and highlights the disciplinary role of the media.